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Abstract 
The empirical literature on economic growth agrees that institutions and governance are important 
determinants of long-run economic growth rates. As a stylized fact, this literature points to a strong 
correlation between the level of GDP per capita and the general development level of institutions 
and governance. However, the growth rate of GDP per capita itself, as well as other indicators that 
are broadly associated with the level of economic development, are generally much less strongly 
correlated with the level of institutional development. We document these correlations, and argue 
that there is a need for a broader set of stylized facts about institutions, governance and economic 
development, covering the broader set of economic indicators, including the growth rate itself. To 
find such stylized facts, we use canonical correlation analysis. We use a database on institutions and 
governance that has a very large number of indicators, and our analysis produces a number of 
aggregated measurements of institutions and governance that broadly correlate with patterns of 
economic development. The analysis confirms the correlation between the general level of 
economic development on the one hand, and institutional development on the other hand, which is 
the core stylized fact identified in the literature. In addition to this, our analysis points to the general 
attitude towards markets, and the level of financial development as specific dimensions of the 
institutional and governance characteristics of a country that correlate highly with specific 
development patterns. In particular, we find that a positive attitude towards markets combined with 
a low level of financial development goes together with growth rates, based on catching-up. We 
also find that a tendency towards market steering combined with strong financial development goes 
together with a high involvement in international trade (openness), combined with a low investment 
rate. 
Keywords: institutions, governance, economic development 
JEL codes: O1, O16, O17 
I thank Thomas Ziesemer for comments on a previous version.  
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1. Introduction 
Governance and institutions are popular long-run determinants of economic growth and 
development in the empirical economic literature. For example, Rodrik et al. (2004, abstract) 
conclude from an elaborate empirical model that “the quality of institutions trumps everything else” 
as an explanation of differences in income levels between countries. Kaufmann and Kraay (2002) 
open by stating that “[p]er capita income and the quality of governance are strongly correlated 
across countries”. Although “institutions” and “governance” are hardly synonyms, there is enough 
of a connection between the two concepts to consider these statements as part of the same general 
approach to explaining economic growth and development.  
In particular, in this paper, we will follow the definition of governance offered by Kaufmann et al. 
(2010, p. 4): “the traditions and institutions by which authority in a country is exercised. This 
includes (a) the process by which governments are selected, monitored and replaced; (b) the 
capacity of the government to effectively formulate and implement sound policies; and (c) the 
respect of citizens and the state for the institutions that govern economic and social interactions 
among them.” According to this definition, governance is a specific subset of “traditions and 
institutions”. The literature usually follows North (1990, p. 3) in defining “institutions” as “the rules 
of the game in a society or, more formally, […] the humanly devised constraints that shape human 
interaction.” The combination of the two definitions sees governance as a specific subset of the 
rules of the game in society that specifies how authority and power is exercised and translated into 
policy. This is the way in which we will understand governance and institutions in this paper. This 
definition immediately clarifies the relationship between institutions and governance on the one 
hand, and economic development on the other hand. Institutions, for example in the form of 
property rights, set the incentives associated to economic actions, while the quality of governance 
will determine the success or failure of economic policies aimed at stimulating development.  
A part of the literature provides very concrete policy recommendations about the type of 
governance that is necessary to stimulate economic growth. For example, the notion of “good 
governance” is strongly associated with empirical work carried out at the World Bank (e.g., 
Kaufmann et al. al, 2004, 2010). In this view, a set of governance characteristics including, for 
example, democratic values (in a broad sense, i.e., also covering aspects that are not directly related 
to elections, such as freedom of the press), clear property rights that are protected by the legal 
system, control of corruption, and free markets in which governments play a non-decisive role, 
provides the optimal setting for achieving high growth rates. What characterizes this set of 
institutions and governance characteristics is that they originated, and are still found in their 
strongest firm, in the Western world that consists of Europe and North America. This view of the 
virtue of Western institutions and governance mechanisms is also found in the so-called 
Washington consensus (Williamson, 1990). Others, such as Rodrik (2005), take a more pluralistic 
view of institutions and governance, and argue that a range of institutional settings and governance 
mechanisms is compatible with high growth. 
Even though “good governance” (whether defined in the Washington consensus way, or otherwise) 
is prescribed as a recipe for growth, the growth rate of the economy is rarely the dependent variable 
in the econometric exercises that dominate the literature (e.g., Acemoglu et al., 2001; Kaufmann 
and Kraay, 2002; Rodrik et al., 2004). Instead, the level of GDP per capita is used as the dependent 
variable in most econometric work in the field. Obviously, the level of GDP per capita in a country 
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is relatively high (as compared to other countries) because that country achieved high growth rates 
in the past. But the link between current institutions and past growth performance is an indirect one 
at best, and ingenious econometric strategies are necessary to establish the direction of causality in 
this relationship.  
The direct and univariate correlation between institutions and governance (no matter how these are 
measured precisely) on the one hand, and GDP per capita on the other hand, is very strong. This is 
an important stylized fact that often justifies (e.g., Kaufmann and Kraay, 2002) the econometric 
interest in trying to establish a causal link from institutions/governance to economic development. 
Such stylized facts are the prime interest in this paper. Our aim is not to contribute to the 
econometric debate about the causal relationship between growth, or the level of economic 
development, and institutions or governance. Instead, we want to broaden the debate by looking for 
a set of stylized fact that involves a broader set of economic variables than just the level of GDP per 
capita. We also want to include other variables, such as the growth rate itself, and variables such as 
investment and openness, into the set of stylized facts about institutions, governance and economic 
development. 
The obvious way in which this can be done is by broadening the set of correlations, and include the 
aforementioned economic variables in a correlation table with indicators of institutions and 
governance. But this does not achieve the aimed goals, because such univariate correlations are 
generally low, as compared to the correlations that are found for GDP per capita. This phenomenon 
will be documented below. As an alternative to this simple strategy, we propose a more 
sophisticated methodology, canonical correlation analysis, which allows us to combine several 
economic indicators into a joint correlation with a set of indicators for institutions and governance. 
In this way, we will be able to derive a number of stylized facts, including the well-known one 
about the strong correlation between the level of GDP per capita and the level of institutional 
development.  
In the econometric literature, an additional issue plays an important role. This is the role of 
geography in shaping institutions and governance. This emphasis on geography arises from the 
econometric need to “explain” institutions themselves. Geography is the ultimate exogenous factor 
that is not determined by the economy or by institutions, and hence it is a prime candidate to 
explain differences in institutions between countries (e.g., Engerman and Sokoloff, 1997; Acemoglu 
et al., 2001). We include geography in the analysis below, by relating the stylized patterns of 
institutions and governance that we derive in the canonical correlation analysis to geographical 
patterns. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, the stylized fact that dominates the 
literature, i.e., a strong correlation between institutions and governance on the one hand, and GDP 
per capita on the other hand, is illustrated using data for a large set of countries. This section 
concludes with an argument why this stylized fact must be broadened, and formulates a set of 
interrelated research questions that will be used to achieve this goal. Section 3 introduces the 
methodology that will be used, and also presents the dataset that will be used to measure institutions 
and governance. In Section 4, we provide an overview of the database on institutions and 
governance, and describe the variables that will be derived from this database and used in the 
subsequent analysis. Section 5 presents the results from the canonical correlation analysis, and 
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presents the stylized facts that are derived using this method. Section 6 concludes the analysis by 
way of a discussion of the main results, and an outlook on future research. 
 
2. Stylized facts and research questions 
The modern growth literature views governance and institutions as prime determinants of long-run 
economic growth patterns. The basic idea is that with “good governance” and “good institutions,” 
the market system will provide optimal incentives for investment in tangible and intangible assets, 
and hence lead to higher standards of living. The theoretical link between institutions and 
governance on the one hand, end economic growth and prosperity on the other hand, is often 
illustrated by cross-country correlations between standards of living and a set of governance and 
institutions indicators. Such correlations are usually strongly positive, and hence the governance 
and institutions indicators used are taken as indicators of “good practice.” The correlation between 
governance/institutions and standards of living is an important stylized fact in the field of empirical 
analysis of economic growth.  
An example of this stylized fact is provided in Figure 1. On the horizontal axis of the subfigures, we 
display the six main indicators that are found in the World Bank’s “Worldwide Governance 
Indicators” (WGI) dataset, and on the vertical axis we display GDP per capita in 2000 (taken from 
the Penn World Tables). The figure contains 123 observations (countries), which are the countries 
for which observations are available in our main database (the Institutional Profiles Database, this 
will be introduced below). The WGI dataset contains 6 separate indicators, which are themselves 
aggregations of various other indicators. In other words, the 6 WGI indicators are composite 
indicators, constructed by applying a weighting scheme to a larger number of indicators. The basic 
idea behind such composite indicators is that the underlying concept that one wants to measure is 
not well captured by an individual indicator, but can be approximated by the larger set of indicators. 
Kaufmann et al. (2010) describe the broad ideas behind the WGI database, as well as its 
construction. 
The 6 WGI indicators measure different aspects of institutions and governance: voice and 
accountability (which measures democratic values), political stability and absence of violence, 
government effectiveness, regulatory quality, rule of law, and control of corruption. All 6 indicators 
appear to be closely correlated with GDP per capita, as is evident from the graphs. The correlation 
coefficients, in the order that the graphs appear, are 0.57, 0.67, 0.82, 0.76, 0.80 and 0.79. In all 
cases, the developed nations, e.g., Europe and North America, appear in the right upper corner. 
Asian nations such as Singapore and Hongkong are also often found in the right upper corner, but 
this is not always the case. These latter two countries are, for example, found on the top of the 
ranking for political stability and absence of violence, and regulatory quality, but further behind on 
voice and accountability.  
Another obvious feature from the graphs in Figure 1 is that the spread of observations around the 
regression lines that are drawn in the figure is larger for countries with low scores for the WGI 
indicators and GDP per capita (i.e., the further we move towards the left-lower corner). This means 
that institutional variety (as measured by these indicators) is larger for countries at lower levels of 
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development, or, alternatively, that economic development levels vary more at low levels of 
institutional development.  
5 
 
 
Figure 1. Partial correlation between GDP per capita and World Bank Governance indicators 
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Figure 1. Partial correlation between GDP per capita and World Bank Governance indicators 
(continued) 
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Figure 1. Partial correlation between GDP per capita and World Bank Governance indicators 
(continued) 
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Differences in standards of living that are observed in today’s global economy are the result of 
centuries-long differences in development patterns and growth rates. Thus, strictly speaking, the 
correlations in Figure 1 only show that those countries that today have “good governance and 
institutions” have grown relatively rapidly over sustained periods of time in the past. The 
correlations do not provide any direct evidence of a relationship between current growth rates and 
current governance/institutions, and not between past growth rates and past institutions/governance. 
Establishing a causal effect from governance and institutions to growth rates on the basis of these 
correlations alone is impossible, because historical data on institutions and governance are not 
included in the plots. In fact, one may just as well raise the hypothesis that current institutions and 
governance structures result from past economic performance (see, e.g., Glaeser et al., 2004). 
In terms of econometric methods, a number of options exist in order to try to establish causality 
between standards of living and institutions/governance. Most often, the approach used is to 
instrument the governance and/or institutions indicators by variables (instruments) that are truly 
exogenous. Popular instruments are geographical variables such as climate (because this aspect of 
the natural environment is obviously not influenced by economic development), or data on “deep 
historical roots,” such as colonization processes. 
This paper is not aimed at elaborating such an econometric approach. Instead, it wants to elaborate 
on the side of the stylized facts about the relationship between governance and institutions on the 
one hand, and economic growth and development on the other hand. In order to do this, we broaden 
the set of economic indicators in the analysis beyond GDP per capita. We include 7 indicators, 
including GDP per capita in 2000, its average annual growth rate over the period 2000 – 2007,1 and 
the variability of this growth rate. Another four indicators measure the structure of the economy in 
terms of spending categories (consumption, investment, government expenditures) and the openness 
(in terms of trade) of the economy. Table 1 presents the formal definitions of these variables, and 
the abbreviations that we will use to refer to them throughout this paper. 
Table 1. Economic indicators used in the analysis 
LY00 GDP per capita, 2000, in international dollars 
GR GDP per capita, average annual growth rate over 2000 – 2007 
C Consumption as a % of GDP, average 2000 – 2007 
I Investment as a % of GDP, average 2000 – 2007 
G Government expenditures as a % of GDP, average 2000 – 2007 
OPEN Exports plus imports as a % of GDP, average 2000 – 2007 
VARG Standard deviation of average annual growth rate of GDP per capita, 2000 – 
2007 
Source of the data: Penn World Tables. 
 
It is also well-known that correlations between the governance and institutions indicators used in 
Figure 1, and a direct measure of current economic growth, are much lower (in fact, close to zero, 
or even negative) than the correlation with the level of GDP per capita (Figure 1). Table 2 provides 
                                                            
1 Although data are available beyond 2007, we use this as the last year because we want to avoid including the impact 
of the global economic crisis that occurred in 2008. How institutions and governance affect the impact of the crisis is 
the topic of a separate analysis. 
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an overview of the correlation coefficients between the 7 economic indicators and the 6 WGI 
indicators. The top row of the table reproduces the correlations with the level of GDP per capita that 
we reviewed earlier in the discussion of Figure 1. In the other rows of the table, there is not a single 
entry that points to a correlation that is even as strong as the weakest correlation (0.57) from the 
first row.   
 
Table 2. Correlation coefficients between economic variables and the 6 WGI indicators  
 Voice and 
Accountability 
Political Stability 
& Absence of 
Violence/Terrorism
Government 
Effectiveness
Regulatory 
Quality
Rule of 
Law 
Control of 
Corruption
LY00 0.57 0.67 0.82 0.76 0.80 0.79
GR -0.07 0.08 -0.02 0.03 -0.04 -0.10
C 0.06 0.24 0.30 0.28 0.31 0.25
I -0.20 -0.10 -0.23 -0.24 -0.21 -0.19
G 0.08 0.35 0.34 0.35 0.31 0.30
OPEN -0.15 -0.39 -0.13 -0.18 -0.20 -0.22
GRVAR -0.42 -0.36 -0.45 -0.45 -0.42 -0.37
 
The strongest correlations beyond the first row of the table are found for the GRVAR variable, and 
all of these correlations are negative. In other words, countries that are more developed in terms of 
institutions and governance, as measured by the WGI dataset, tend to have less variation in their 
growth rates (during the pre-crisis 2000s). There are also fairly strong, and positive, correlations 
between the share of government in GDP (G) and the WGI indicators, except for Voice and 
Accountability. Interestingly, investment (I) is negatively correlated with all 6 WGI indicators. The 
growth rate of GDP per capita (GR) shows very weak correlations (the maximum absolute value 
observed in Table 2 is 0.10). We can thus safely conclude from Table 2 that the correlations 
between institutions/governance and the level of economic development are very strong, but this 
correlation is much weaker for other economic indicators.  
In interpreting the correlations between the economic indicators and the institutional indicators, it 
must be borne in mind that there is no single indicator that represents institutional quality in all its 
dimensions. As already stressed above, the indicators used here so far are composite indicators, 
weighting together many other indicators covering a range of aspects of the institutional 
environment. The alternative found in the literature (e.g., Acemoglu and Robinson, 2001) is to use a 
particular selection from the range individual indicators that is available. Institutions and 
governance are multi-faceted phenomena that are not directly observed in their entirety.  
The weightings used in the construction of these composite indicators are likely to influence the 
correlations that were reported in Figure 1 and Table 2. This means that the stylized facts that often 
are the starting point of the analysis of institutions/governance and economic growth, also depend 
on these weights. In case that the stylized facts are formulated in terms of single governance/ 
institutions indicators, they will depend on the particular choice for a single indicator that is made 
by the researcher. 
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Very little theory is available to guide the choice of weights that are used to construct the composite 
indicators, or to select individual indicators from the large spectrum that is available. For lack of 
such a theoretical framework, the weighting schemes that are employed are often simply equal 
weights, or hierarchical systems in which weighting within and between different levels of 
indicators is done on the basis of equal weights. However, there is nothing, besides the 
attractiveness of having a simple concept, that speaks for such equal weights constructs.  
This leads us to a formulation of the research questions of this paper. We want to explore the 
available set of indicators on institutions and governance to investigate whether, at lower levels of 
aggregation of these indicators, we can discover a stronger and broader set of stylized facts than the 
correlation between the level of economic development and the level of institutional development 
(i.e., Figure 1). Thus, we ask whether there any aspects of institutions and governance that we have 
overlooked (or “aggregated away”) in Figure 1 and Table 2, and which show higher correlation 
coefficients with the economic variables that we have selected, and, in particular, with growth. 
A slight variation of this research question starts by asking whether there are any typical 
(“stylized”) patterns within either the set of economic variables, or the set of institutional/ 
governance indicators. An example of such a pattern that might be found within the economic 
development indicators dataset is the typical negative correlation between the level of GDP per 
capita and the subsequent growth rate. This negative correlation is well-known in the literature 
about economic growth (see, e.g., Abramovitz, 1986, Verspagen, 1991, and Barro and Sala-i-
Martin, 1995) and is either interpreted as a phenomenon related to the international diffusion of 
technological knowledge (Fagerberg, Srholec and Verspagen, 2010), or to the transition of a 
country’s growth path to a steady state as predicted by e.g., the Solow model of economic growth 
(Solow, 1956).  
If such stylized patterns exist both in the economic development domain and the institutions/ 
governance domain, an interesting question is how these patterns in the two domains are related to 
each other. Continuing the previous “catching-up” example, the question would become whether a 
”catching-up” pattern of economic development is correlated with a typical pattern for 
institutions/governance. Our main research questions here are whether we can detect such patterns 
in the data, how these patterns can be interpreted, and what they imply for the research agenda on 
governance, growth and institutions.  
 
3. Data and methodology 
For the dataset on institutions and governance, we resort to a different source, mainly because we 
want to start from a larger set of basic indicators than just the 6 WGI indicators that were used 
before. We therefore use the Institutional Profiles Database (IPD), which is a database that is based 
on a survey among French diplomats, asking them about institutional and governance 
characteristics of the countries in which they serve. The IPD database is described in detail in 
Meisel and Ould Aoudia (2007). We use the 2009 version of the database, which covers 123 
countries across the world. Berthelier et al. (2004) use an older version of the database to derive a 
number of stylized facts about development and institutions.  
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The questions in the IPD survey are categorized in a 2-dimensional scheme, which covers 4 
“sectors” and nine “functions” of the institutional system. The “sectors” cover the broad types of 
institutions and governance mechanisms that can be found, and are specified as follows: A) public 
institutions and civil society; B) the market for goods and services; C) the capital market; D) the 
labour market and social relations. The “functions” cover broad purposes of the system, and are 
specified as follows: (i) political institutions, (ii) security, law and order, (iii) functioning of public 
administrations, (iv) free operation of markets, (v) coordination of stakeholders and strategic vision, 
(vi) security of transactions and contracts, (vii) market regulation and social dialogue, (viii) 
openness to the outside world, and (ix) social cohesion. While this categorization yields, in 
principle, 9x4=36 subclasses of indicators, some of these potential subclasses are empty, resulting 
in 26 subclasses of indicators.  
The IPD database contains 367 “elementary items”, which are essentially questions that were posed 
to the respondents. These questions ask the respondent to rank a particular institutional aspect of the 
country in which they work on either a 1 – 4 or a 0 – 4 scale. The exact meaning of the scale differs 
per question, but is always explained with the question. Usually, if the scale is 0 – 4, it is somewhat 
“discontinuous” from 0 to 1, but “continuous” for 1 – 4. An example question is “Do the 
representative political institutions (parliament or equivalent) operate in compliance with the formal 
rules in force (constitution or equivalent)?”, for which the answers would be “0 = no representative 
institutions. If representative institutions, from 1 = operation far from in compliance with the formal 
rules in force to 4 = operation closely in line with the rules in force”.  
The 367 elementary items are aggregated into 2 hierarchical levels, one containing 133 variables, 
and the other one 93 variables. These aggregated variables are obtained by taking weighted 
averages of questions that address a similar issue. For example, the aggregate variable “legality of 
political institutions” combines the following 5 questions: (i) Freedom and legality of elections, (ii) 
Do the representative political institutions (parliament or equivalent) operate in compliance with the 
formal rules in force (constitution or equivalent)? (iii) Do the political oversight institutions 
(constitutional court or equivalent, etc.) operate in compliance with the formal rules in force 
(constitution or equivalent)? (iv) Are there any institutions that de jure or de facto have a significant 
influence over the political running of the country alongside the legal institutions (political party, 
religious organisation, armed body, etc.)? (v) Participation of armed forces in political life, de jure 
or de facto. 
The aggregate question is measured on a 0 – 4 scale, and is a weighted average of the individual 
answers. The weights in the weighted average are equal to the standard deviation of answers over 
countries. This is done in order to give a larger weight to items that discriminate more between 
countries. Thus, in the hypothetical case that all countries would have the same score, the item 
would receive a weight of zero. 
The data for the version of the database that we use (IPD-2009) was collected by the French 
Ministry of Finance, and hence the respondents had a professional obligation to invest the necessary 
effort to complete the long survey. The respondents were chosen among those working in the 
French diplomatic service (usually, economic missions) in the country for which the data were 
being collected. The data were cleaned by the survey organizers, and where necessary, the 
respondents were contacted again to make sure that a complete response was received. 
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The methodology that will be used here is canonical correlation analysis (CCA).2 This is a 
technique that is vaguely related to factor analysis, or principal components analysis (PCA). 
Because PCA is more widely used than CCA, we start by giving a brief description of how PCA 
works, and then explain how CCA differs. The basic idea in PCA, which is a specific type of factor 
analysis, is to reduce the number of variables in a dataset by constructing a set of new variables, 
each of which is a weighted average of the original variables. The weights in this weighted average 
are chosen in such a way that if one projects3 the original data on the new variable, the sum of the 
residuals of this projection is minimized. Mathematically, this minimization is obtained by 
maximizing the variance of the new variable, which is also called a principal component. 
Technically, the weights in PCA are equal to the eigenvector of the correlation (or covariance) 
matrix that describes the original data. A number of these eigenvectors exists (as many as there are 
variables in the original dataset), and the residual of the projection is minimized by taking the 
eigenvector with the largest eigenvalue. Interestingly, the residuals from the projection given by the 
first eigenvector, are in turn “best” projected onto the second eigenvector, and so on for each next 
eigenvector. Thus, when we rank the eigenvectors of the correlation matrix by the corresponding 
eigenvalues, each next eigenvector summarizes, in the best possible way, the part of the data that 
has not yet been summarized. 
The idea of reducing a dataset by taking weighted averages of the original variables is shared 
between PCA and CCA. It is an attractive idea in the context of the data that we have used so far, 
because, as was described above, we are trying to capture a concept (“institutions and governance”, 
or “economic development”) that is not well described by a single variable, but instead can be 
captured by a combination of indicators. This is why others who have used the IPD have opted for 
PCA as a main exploration technique (e.g., Meisel and Ould Aoudia, 2007; De Combrugghe and 
Farla, 2011). The WGI indicators that we used above are in fact weighted averages of a larger set of 
indicators dealing with institutions and governance. Instead of the specific weighting schemes that 
were used to construct the 6 composite indicators in Figure 1, we could also use weights that are 
obtained from PCA, or, as will be done below, from canonical correlation analysis.  
The main thing that distinguishes CCA from PCA is that it uses two datasets rather than one. For 
example, we could use one dataset that captures various aspects of “institutions and governance”, 
which could be IPD, and one dataset that captures various aspects of “economic development”. 
Canonical correlation analysis reduces both datasets to a lower number of dimensions, as PCA does 
with its single dataset. Like PCA, CCA also works by taking weighted averages of the original 
variables. The way in which these weights are found, and this is different from PCA, is by 
maximization of the correlation coefficient between the two new variables, i.e., one for each 
dataset. Thus, canonical correlation analysis summarizes each dataset in such a way that the new 
variables that result from the summary are maximally correlated (whereas PCA choses the weights 
in such a way that the original data and the new variable are maximally correlated). 
Like PCA, canonical correlation analysis works by finding eigenvalues and eigenvectors. However, 
there are now two matrices on which this is done, one for each dataset, and both of these matrices 
are somewhat more complicated than the correlation matrix that is used in PCA. Still, the basic idea 
                                                            
22 A general reference that explains the technical details of canonical correlation analysis and principal components 
analysis, is Anderson (2003). 
3 Projection means “vector projection”. 
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of using subsequent eigenvectors, ranked on corresponding eigenvalues, remains the same. The pair 
consisting of the first eigenvector in each of the datasets yields the largest correlation, the next pair 
the next largest correlation, etc. 
It is easily seen how this idea of maximizing correlations between summaries of two datasets links 
up to our research questions, which ask for stylized descriptions (summaries) of data patterns that 
describe the main correlations between the phenomena that are of interest to us, i.e., economic 
development, institutions and governance. Canonical correlation analysis supplies us with a number 
of such summaries (eigenvectors, also called loading vectors) that give us the maximally attainable 
correlations that exist in the data. We will therefore proceed to run a series of canonical correlation 
analyses, using one dataset on institutions and governance, and one dataset on economic 
development. The latter will be the dataset that consists of the 7 indicators in Table 1, and which 
have been used before in Table 2. 
As could be expected from the similarity between PCA and CCA, the two methodologies suffer 
from the same type of drawbacks. Perhaps the most important one is that the outcomes of the 
analysis have nothing to offer in terms of identifying causality. In the context of our research 
question, which asks for associations or correlations instead of causal mechanisms, this is not a 
main problem. 
 
4. Institutions and Governance in the IPD database 
We now proceed to analyze the IPD database in conjunction with the economic development 
dataset. The main advantage of this database over the WGI dataset is that it is available in the most 
disaggregated format, which enables us to go beyond the maximum of 6 dimensions that are 
available in the public version of the WGI database.  
However, the canonical correlation analysis that we use, requires us, like most other statistical 
techniques, to use (significantly) less variables than observations. This is why we opted for the 
highest aggregation level of the elementary items, which gives 93 variables. However, with 123 
countries, this is still too much, so we reduced the number of variables in the final canonical 
correlation analysis even more. This was done by principal components analysis (PCA), which was 
performed on all variables within each of the four sectors in IPD: A) public institutions and civil 
society; B) the market for goods and services; C) the capital market; D) the labour market and 
social relations. This yields a set of principal components for each of the four sectors of IPD. We 
selected, mechanically, all principal components with eigenvalues above 1, which yields 22 new 
variables (8 in sector A, 7 in sector B, 3 in sector C and 4 in sector D). De Crombrugghe and Farla 
(2011) present an aggregation method of the IPD variables that is broadly similar to the approach 
that we follow here. 
 
 
 
 
Table 3. Summary of the most important IPD variables resulting from the principal components analysis 
 Public institutions and 
civil society 
Market for goods and services Capital market Labour market and 
social relations 
Function A1 – Efficient 
democracy 
B1 – Positive market 
attitude 
B2 – Market steering C1 – Development of 
the financial system 
D1 – Development of 
social relations 
Political institutions Stable democracies 
with decentralized 
governance 
-- -- -- Freedom of 
association, 
autonomous trade 
unions 
Security, Law and 
order 
Control of violence -- -- -- -- 
Public administration Efficient governance, 
limited lobby 
influence 
Easy to start a business, 
public support for firms 
and natural resource 
management oriented 
towards public interests 
Special economic 
zones, public support 
for firms oriented 
towards public 
interests 
-- -- 
Free operation of 
markets 
-- Efficient public 
organizations, 
transparent and open 
privatizations, freedom 
of prices  
Some price control Free loan market Re-training and re-
skilling important 
Coordination of 
Stakeholders and 
Strategic vision 
Effective political 
systems, long-run 
political vision 
Innovation and 
innovation policy 
important 
Some innovation 
policy 
Competent bankers, 
venture capital 
important 
Strong relationship 
between education 
system and labour 
market, adult 
vocational training 
Security of 
transactions and 
contracts 
Property right and 
contracts well ensured 
Transparent markets, 
intellectual property 
protected, little 
collective land 
ownership 
Land in high demand, 
involvement of large 
investors in land 
markets 
Strong financial 
information 
Respect for workers’ 
rights 
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 Public institutions and 
civil society 
Market for goods and services Capital market Labour market and 
social relations 
Market regulation & 
social dialogue 
-- Weak barriers of entry, 
anti-trust policy, little 
public shareholding 
Public shareholding 
important, land 
policies important 
Competition in 
banking sector, 
financial regulation 
and monitoring 
Mostly central wage 
bargaining, well-
developed labour-
employers relations 
Openness to outside 
world 
Western oriented 
(USA and Europe) 
Free trade, free flow of 
capital 
Some trade 
restrictions, some free 
flow of capital 
Financial openness Open employment for 
non-nationals 
Social cohesion Large national 
cohesion and social 
inclusion 
-- -- Micro credit not 
important 
High quality public 
education and health 
care systems, weak 
segmentation in labour 
markets, absence of 
child labour, high 
social mobility, 
policies regarding 
income distribution 
exist 
(Table 3 continued)
 
 
The full details (loadings on all 93 variables and eigenvalues) are available in the appendix. Here 
we discuss a subset of the six principal components that will appear to be most prominent in the 
next section, where we relate the IPD data to economic development. These are summarized in 
Table 3, where a breakdown has been made in terms of the nine functions that the IPD database 
features. In the “Public institutions and civil society” sector, we discuss the first principal 
component (PC), which we summarize as the archetype of efficient democracy (here, “democracy” 
is used in a broad sense). It stresses the importance of democratic institutions, property rights, 
openness to the world and control of (state) violence. But this PC also includes a strategic vision of 
the government, and efficient public administration.  
We find two important PCs in sector B) the market for goods and services. The first PC here 
measures a generally positive attitude towards markets. It stresses the ease of starting new 
businesses, freedom of prices, transparent privatizations, anti-trust policies, absence of public 
shareholders in business, etc. Interestingly, it also captures efficient public organizations, and the 
intention to serve public interests by policies aimed at firms. The second PC in this sector captures 
the intention to manipulate and steer markets, for example by special economic zones, price 
controls, public shareholding, and some restrictions on free trade. This PC also loads high on the 
importance of land policies in development. 
In the last two sectors, we find only one important PC per sector. For the C) capital markets sector, 
the first PC measures the overall development of the financial system. It stresses the free operation 
and international openness of the financial system, but also the competence of bankers, and the 
extent of regulation. The first PC in the D) labour market and social relations sector measures the 
general level of development of social relations between employers, workers and the government. It 
does not stress very much the free operation of labour markets, but instead focuses on training and 
education opportunities for workers, workers’ rights, freedom of association, and a health care 
system. 
 
5. Empirical analysis 
5.1. Economic Development 
We start by looking at the correlation coefficients between the variables in the economic 
development dataset (as in Table 1) on the one hand, and the IPD dataset (as reduced by the 
procedure described above) on the other hand. These correlation coefficients are displayed in Table 
4. The bottom row summarizes the maxima of the absolute values of the correlation coefficients for 
an individual variable. This is very high for the level of GDP per capita (LY00), which correlates 
very strongly with each of the first PCs of the four sections in IPD (i.e., AF1, BF1, CF1 and DF1). 
The other correlations in the table are much lower than this. Even though all of the economic 
development variables correlate significantly with at least one of the IPD variables, it is clear that 
the correlation between institutions on the one hand, and the level of GDP per capita on the other 
hand, is not representative for the full range of economic variables in our dataset. Obviously, this is 
consistent with the results in Table 2. Hence, we can confirm that, broadly speaking, the IPD dataset 
is similar to the WGI dataset in terms of the correlations that it offers with the variables in our 
dataset on economic development. 
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Table 4. Correlation coefficients between the economic variables and the IPD variables 
 LY00 GR C I G OPEN GRVAR Max(abs.)
AF1* 0.76 -0.01 0.15 -0.15 0.24 -0.07 -0.48 0.76
AF2 0.23 0.19 0.28 0.10 0.17 -0.03 0.06 0.28
AF3 -0.08 0.01 -0.02 -0.05 -0.06 0.38 0.08 0.38
AF4 0.08 0.22 0.30 -0.16 0.19 -0.08 -0.13 0.30
AF5 -0.09 0.01 -0.03 0.13 -0.09 -0.13 0.01 0.13
AF6 -0.04 0.30 0.06 0.00 -0.20 0.19 0.05 0.30
AF7 -0.09 0.17 -0.20 -0.05 -0.11 0.13 0.01 0.20
AF8 -0.04 -0.27 0.01 -0.17 0.02 0.05 -0.03 0.27
BF1* 0.80 0.01 0.16 -0.18 0.27 -0.08 -0.43 0.80
BF2* 0.14 0.17 0.23 -0.11 0.12 0.26 0.01 0.26
BF3 0.16 -0.14 -0.09 0.00 -0.17 -0.01 0.06 0.16
BF4 0.04 0.15 0.06 0.07 0.20 -0.17 0.13 0.20
BF5 -0.20 -0.16 -0.10 0.02 -0.06 -0.02 -0.05 0.20
BF6 0.00 -0.02 -0.06 0.05 0.03 -0.10 0.05 0.10
BF7 0.11 0.16 0.14 -0.11 0.12 -0.11 -0.12 0.16
CF1* 0.69 -0.12 0.08 -0.27 0.19 -0.10 -0.45 0.69
CF2 0.35 0.15 0.14 0.05 0.14 0.15 -0.04 0.35
CF3 -0.21 0.09 -0.06 -0.01 -0.19 0.32 -0.06 0.32
DF1* 0.71 -0.03 0.02 -0.12 0.21 -0.05 -0.37 0.71
DF2 0.22 0.11 0.22 -0.01 0.30 -0.18 -0.03 0.30
DF3 -0.36 0.01 -0.19 -0.05 -0.06 0.09 0.08 0.36
DF4 0.07 0.13 0.20 -0.01 0.09 0.10 0.03 0.20
Max(abs.) 0.80 0.30 0.30 0.27 0.27 0.38 0.48 
Notes: * These variables were discussed in Table 4. 
Values printed in bold are significant (p-value<0.05), values printed in bold and italics are significant (p<0.01). 
 
The correlations in Table 4 set a benchmark for the canonical correlation analysis, because we 
would expect that, if (more) coherent patterns exist between the two datasets, including a broader 
set of correlations in the analysis, would lead to higher correlations. We start by running canonical 
correlations between the IPD dataset on the one hand, and each of the variables in Table 1 
separately. This means that one of the two datasets in the analysis, the economic indicators, has 
only a single variable. In this case, the canonical correlation coefficient is identical to the square 
root of the R2 of a multiple regression with the economic indicator as the dependent variable, and 
the 22 IPD indicators as explanatory variables. The loadings on the IPD indicators are equal to the 
regression coefficients. This exercise is intended to explore the simplest type of stylized fact, i.e., 
how indicators of governance and institutions are jointly correlated with single dimensions of 
economic development. The results are displayed in Figure 2. Although the canonical correlation 
analysis that underlies Figure 2 included 22 IPD indicators, as in Table 4, we only display the 
results for the 5 indicators that were discussed earlier (the appendix gives the full set of loadings). 
The reason for this selection is twofold: on the one hand we want to simplify interpretation by 
looking at a limited number of indicators (even though a much larger number of indicators were 
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included in the analysis), and on the other hand these 5 indicators are the ones that yield sizable 
absolute values of the loadings.4,5  
 
Figure 2. Loadings obtained in the canonical correlation analysis, one economic variable, all 
IPD variables 
 
The canonical correlation coefficients range from 0.55 (for investment) to 0.91 (for GDP per 
capita). This confirms the impression from the univariate correlation coefficients in Tables 2 and 4. 
The level of GDP per capita is the variable from our economic development dataset that correlates 
most strongly with institutions and governance indicators. But interestingly, growth now has the 
second-highest canonical correlation coefficient, equal to 0.64. 
In the figure, we see that the loadings of the IPD indicators differ substantially between the 
economic indicators. Most of the correlations are dominated by a single, or a few, IPD indicator(s). 
For GDP per capita (LY00), the highest loading is on Financial development, but all other loadings 
are positive too, and those on Efficient democracy and Positive market attitude are also sizable. For 
Growth (GR), the combination of IPD indicators more than doubles the correlation, relative to a 
case of univariate correlations with only a single IPD indicator (Table 4). Thus, growth seems to be 
correlated to complex set of institutional/governance indicators. In this case, Positive market 
attitude stands out with a high and positive loading, while Financial development stands out with a 
strongly negative loading. 
The other five economic development indicators all have canonical correlation coefficients that are 
in a narrow range of 0.55 – 0.59. Consumption as a share of GDP has positive loadings on all IPD 
indicators, except Social relations development, which is strongly negative. Investment, on the other 
                                                            
4 The selection was done on the basis of the results of the canonical correlation analysis that will be presented below, in 
which all economic indicators are correlated to all IPD indicators. In this case, the maximum absolute value of loadings 
for the 17 IPD indicators that are not displayed was 0.34, while none of the 5 selected IPD indicators had a maximum 
absolute value of the loadings that was less than 0.47. 
5 All loadings are scaled in such a way that the sum of squares of all loadings in a “factor” is equal to 1.  
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hand, has negative loadings for 3 out of the 5 IPD indicators, and, surprisingly, especially Financial 
development stands out with a strongly negative loading. The share of government in GDP has only 
moderately-sized loading, which are all positive, except the one for Financial development. 
Openness also has only moderately-sized loadings, but this is not true for the variability of growth. 
This last variable loads strongly negative on Efficient democracy, and Financial development, and 
positively on Development of social relations. 
While these correlations are insightful, there is no particular reason why we should have only a 
single variable on the side of the economic indicators dataset. The power of the canonical 
correlations framework lies in being able to summarize both datasets in terms of loadings, while 
maximizing the correlations. Thus, we proceed to an analysis in which all 22 IPD indicators and all 
7 economic development indicators are included. This is displayed in Figure 3. Since we have 22 
variables in the IPD dataset and 7 in the economic development dataset, we get 7 “factors,” which 
are correlated with each other between the datasets in a decreasing order. In our specific case, the 
highest canonical correlation is 0.93, the lowest is 0.39. 
We can use the loadings to characterize these factors. For the first one (correlation = 0.93), we have 
positive loadings on most variables in the economic development dataset, except GRVAR (the 
loadings for C and I are positive but very close to zero). Especially LY00 has high positive 
loadings, the other loadings are of moderate proportion. In summary, countries that score high on 
the first economic development factor are developed countries with low variation in their growth 
rate over time. On the IPD side, all loadings are positive, and the ones for Efficient democracy, 
positive market attitude and Financial development are highest.   
Compared to the first, the canonical correlation for the pair of second factors is significantly less, 
i.e., 0.64, although this is still fairly high, especially as compared to the correlation coefficients in 
Table 4. On the economic development side, growth of per capita GDP (GR) dominates the 
loadings. The level of GDP per capita has a slightly negative loading, which is consistent with a 
catching-up pattern (poor countries grow faster), although this is relatively weak, because the 
loading on GDP per capita does not have a high absolute value. The other loadings on the economic 
development side for this factor all have low absolute values. On the IPD side of the second factor, 
two loadings stand out: the one for Positive market attitude, with a high positive loading, and the 
one for Financial development, with a relatively strongly negative loading. High growth rates are 
correlated with embracing markets, but also with a low level of development of the financial sector. 
The third pair of factors only has a marginally lower correlation coefficient (0.63) and must 
therefore be considered on an equal footing with the second pair of factors. On the economic dataset 
side, this one is dominated by a high and positive loading on openness, a positive but moderate 
loading on GRVAR, as well as a relatively strongly negative loading on investment. On the IPD 
side, the positive loadings on Market steering and Financial development are most striking. 
Although the remaining 4 correlations are still fairly high, the specific loading patterns that they are 
associated with are also harder to interpret, because they include a mixture of high absolute values 
that are not easy to link together in a clear-cut interpretation. Therefore, we do not discuss these 
factors in detail, but instead focus on the factors that have been discussed so far.  
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Figure 3. Loadings obtained in the canonical correlation analysis, all economic variables, all 
IPD variables (loadings on IPD variables on the left, loadings on economic variables on the 
right) 
 
We continue this discussion by looking at the scatterplots of the correlations of the first three 
canonical factors. These plots are in Figure 4. In the first plot, we see the tight (0.93) correlation 
between the level of economic development (vertical axis) and institutional development 
(horizontal axis). This is the correlation that is essentially captured by the standard stylized fact 
about institutions/governance and economic development (e.g., Figure 1). It is a familiar picture, 
with the Western countries (North- and West-Europe, North America) in the upper-right corner. 
They are joined there by some of the high-income Asian countries, such as Singapore and 
Hongkong, and some countries from the Middle East (United Arab Emirates, Kuwait). In the lower-
left part of the figure, we find many African countries (with Zimbabwe and the Democratic 
Republic of Congo as negative outliers).  
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The second plot is rather different. This captures the high-growth (catching-up) factor from the 
economic development dataset, and a positive market attitude and low level of financial 
development on the IPD side. The countries in the upper-right part of the plot are a heterogeneous 
geographical group, including China, Angola, Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, Ukraine, Israel, Romania, 
Qatar and Vietnam. Once again, many African countries are in the lower-left part, but now they are 
joined by some of the developed countries, such as Australia, Austria, Belgium and the Netherlands. 
The last plot captures the openness factor on the economic side, and market steering and financial 
development on the IPD side. In the right-upper corner of the graph, we see a group of very large 
countries: USA, China, India, Philippines, Mexico and Indonesia. We do not see a particular bias 
towards Africa in the lower-left part of the figure, but also see some other countries there (in 
particular, a mixture of European countries such as Finland and Estonia). In this figure, like the 
previous, we do not see any particular clustering of developed countries.  
Summarizing, we can say that our first pair of factors from the canonical correlation analysis 
captures the well-known stylized fact about the relationship between economic development, 
institutions and governance, which is that the general level of institutional development is correlated 
strongly with the general level of economic development (GDP per capita). This pair of factors 
ranks countries by their level of development, in particular the economic dimension and the 
institutional/governance dimension, and nothing else.  
The second and third pairs of factors represent a new set of stylized facts. On the economic side, 
growth (of GDP per capita) and openness (in terms of trade) are the defining variables in these new 
stylized facts. On the side of institutions and governance, the attitude towards markets (for goods 
and services) and the level of financial development appear as the important variables. In particular, 
we find a strong correlation between catching-up based growth (high growth in countries that are 
somewhat less developed) on the one hand, and a positive attitude to markets and low level of 
financial development on the other hand. The second new stylized fact that we identify is between 
openness (and a low investment rate) on the one hand, and market steering combined with a high 
level of financial development on the other hand.  
Together, this provides a rather interesting mixture of different roles of finance and markets in 
economic development. On the one hand, free markets seem to go together with high growth rates, 
but market steering seems to go together with high involvement in trade. On the other hand, 
financial development seems to come and/or go with a high involvement in trade, but does not seem 
to combine very well with a high growth rate. Of course, these stylized facts are specific for the 
period that we investigate (i.e., the pre-crisis 2000s), and are based on multivariate rather than 
univariate correlations.  
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Figure 3. Scatterplots of the first 3 factors estimated by canonical correlation analysis
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Figure 3. Scatterplots of the first 3 factors estimated by canonical correlation analysis 
(continued) 
 
5.2. Geography 
Geography is often seen as an ultimate causal factor behind institutions and governance (Acemoglu 
and Robinson, 2001; Engerman and Sokoloff, 1997), and is therefore often used as an instrument 
for institutions in growth regressions. Like institutions themselves, geography is a multi-faceted 
phenomenon, including such diverse factors as climate, access to waterways, fertility of land, the 
disease environment, elevation, etc. Thus, when choosing the particular instrument to use in a 
regression, researchers have had to make a particular choice from this broad set of indicators.  
We conclude our analysis by using the canonical correlation analysis to look for correlations 
between, on the one hand, the three dimensions of institutions and governance that we have 
identified so far, and geography on the other hand. To do this, we make use of a dataset on 
geographical factors that has often been applied in the empirical analysis of economic growth and 
development (Gallup et al., 1999). This dataset contains a large amount of variables, from which we 
select 54 basic indicators that broadly cover 3 groups of geographical phenomena: (i) climate and 
soil conditions (15 indicators), (ii) occurrence of a number of (tropical) diseases (29 indicators), and 
(iii) physical geography, including access to waterways and elevation (10 indicators).  
We apply the same procedure as was applied earlier for the IPD dataset, i.e., we run principal 
components analysis within each of the three subgroups of indicators in the geography dataset, and 
maintain only the principal components with eigenvalues above 1. In this way, we obtain 17 new 
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indicators: 8 for the disease environment, 7 for the climate group, and 2 for the physical 
environment. These 17 new indicators are used in the canonical correlation analysis. The details of 
the PCA analysis that led to the reducing of the geography dataset are provided in the appendix. 
Following the idea from the literature that geography can be seen as an ultimate determinant of 
institutions and governance, we are primarily interested in the relation between each of the IPD 
dimensions that we obtained before, and the geographical variables in our dataset. In other words, 
we want to know about the geographical context of the three IPD dimensions that we extracted in 
combination with economic development patterns (previous section). Therefore, we only look at 
canonical correlations with one of the IPD dimensions, and all 17 geographical indicators (rather 
than using all IPD dimensions, or even all IPD indicators) in combination with the 17 geographical 
indicators.  
In order to save space, we do not document the details of the principal components analysis within 
the geography dataset, nor the detailed loadings of the canonical correlation analysis (these are 
provided in the appendix). Instead, we jump immediately to the scatterplots describing the 
canonical correlations that were obtained. These are in Figure 4.  
The strongest canonical correlation (0.80) is obtained for the first IPD dimension, i.e., the one that 
describes the general level of institutional development, and which correlates strongly with the level 
of economic development. On the geographical side, the loadings in this correlation point to a low 
occurrence of tropical diseases, a steppe climate, and (moderately) easy access to waterways 
(oceans and large rivers). In general, this factor can be interpreted as a set of favourable geographic 
conditions. In the scatterplot, we see the developed nations of Europe and North America, along 
with some Middle East and Asian countries emerging on top of the distribution (upper-right part of 
the graph). Once again, the lower-left corner is full of African countries, indicating that this 
continent is plagued by unfavourable geographical and institutional conditions.  
As before, this geographical factor captures the well-known stylized facts about geography, 
development and institutions. Countries that core low on a general scale of institutional and 
economic development are characterized by particular geographical conditions, including a bad 
disease environment, unfavourable climate, and difficult access to waterways. This result confirms 
existing results in the literature. 
The next two IPD dimensions introduce new stylized facts, as described above. In terms of their 
correlation with geography (in the canonical correlation analysis), we obtain significantly lower 
correlations, i.e., 0.44 and 0.47, respectively, for the second (growth) and third (openness) 
dimensions. For the second IPD dimension, which has been described as a combination of a 
positive market attitude and low financial development, the loadings on the geographical indicators 
first of all point negatively to a tropical climate. Thus, countries outside the tropics will score 
relatively high on this factor. Otherwise, a steppe climate has  moderately positive loading, and a 
combination of specific diseases, including malaria and yellow fever, also has a moderately positive 
loading. Overall, this geographical dimension is less clear than the first one, as is also evident from 
the graph. We find a mixture of countries including Ukraine, Vietnam and Mongolia on top of the 
ranking (and hence in the top-right part of the graph). Many African countries score low in this 
geographical dimension, but also Singapore and Hongkong have low scores. 
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Figure 4. Scatterplots of the factors estimated by canonical correlation analysis between IPD 
dimensions and geography   
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Figure 4. Scatterplots of the factors estimated by canonical correlation analysis between IPD 
dimensions and geography (continued) 
 
The third IPD factor covers market steering a high level of financial development. In the 
geographical context, a maritime or alpine climate loads high. Asian countries such as China, Korea 
and Philippines score high on this geography factor, Northern European countries such as Finland 
and Estonia negatively.  
 
6. Summary, conclusions, discussion and outlook 
Our canonical correlation analysis has identified a number of stylized facts on the relationship 
between institutions, governance and economic development. The first one of these confirms the 
one stylized fact that dominates the literature, i.e., that the level of development, as indicated by per 
capita GDP, is positively correlated with the level of development of institutions and governance. 
Richer countries tend to be more democratic, have more efficient governments, have better and 
more active policies, more open markets, more developed financial systems, and more developed 
social relations. This correlation is generally interpreted as a causal relation from institutions to 
economic growth, although more advanced econometric methods are necessary to establish the 
direction of causality 
In addition to this stylized fact, we find two additional stylized facts. These involve specific aspects 
of the governance and institutions environment. One additional stylized fact is that catching-up 
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based growth, i.e., high growth rates in countries with a low initial GDP per capita, is correlated 
with a positive attitude towards markets, and a low level of financial development. The other 
stylized fact is that countries that are very open in terms of trade, and which have relatively low 
investment rates, tend to also be countries that have relatively strongly developed financial systems, 
but also elaborate policy mechanisms that are aimed at influencing or steering markets.  
Even though the direction causality is not established in these correlations, they provide an 
interesting perspective on the relationship between institutions, governance and economic 
development. One the one hand, they confirm conventional wisdom about the efficiency of market 
economies in generating economic growth (e.g., Williamson, 1990), but on the other hand, they also 
stress the importance of policy mechanisms that influence and steer markets. Especially in 
economies that open up to the outside world, this type of governance seems to be important.  
With regard to the financial system, our results stress the importance of a broad perspective. 
Financial systems are not assessed alone on the basis of how open and liberal they are, but also on 
the competence of their actors (bankers) and the regulation mechanisms that are in place. Viewed in 
this way, our results stress the importance of a well-developed financial system for countries that 
are integrated in the world economy. However, and perhaps somewhat unexpected on the basis of 
conventional wisdom, such integrated countries with well-developed financial systems also tend to 
have relatively low investment rates. Overall, then, the role that finance that emerges from our 
analysis seems to be one of balanced and gradual growth, where financial development gradually 
expands together with economic development in a broader sense. Financial development does not 
seem to be leading economic development in the broader sense. 
Does this modify our existing impression of the broad correlations between economic development, 
institutions and governance? It does to the extent that we have shown that there are also correlations 
with other economic variables than the level of GDP per capita, for example a direct measure of the 
growth rate, and the shares of spending categories in GDP. This opens up possibilities for applying 
econometric models in which these variables, first of all the growth rate, are the dependent variable. 
In this way, the topic of institutions and governance may be integrated into the other empirical 
growth literature in a more direct way. In doing so, our analysis suggests that the primary focus in 
terms of explanatory variables should not be on the broad average of institutional development 
(because this correlates well with the level of development, not the growth rate), but on specific 
aspects of institutions and governance. In particular the policy attitude towards markets and the 
financial systems seem to be important variables for explaining growth. 
It is interesting to see that the variables that capture the democratic nature of a society, and the 
nature of social and labour relations do not figure prominently in the canonical correlations for 
growth. The former of these variables, democracy, only seems to play a large role in the correlation 
with the general development level, while the latter, labour and social relations, seems to be mostly 
important for explaining consumption. This result suggests that institutions and governance should 
not be looked upon as a single-dimensional phenomenon, in which countries can only travel 
forward or backward. Instead, there are specific institutional arrangements and policies that 
stimulate specific aspects of economic development. Although not everything goes, governments 
have choices. 
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These results are hardly final conclusions, for at least two reasons. First, they refer to a limited 
period in time, the pre-crisis 2000s. Because the global economy has undergone important changes 
over the past few decades, it is to be expected that institutional and governance setups that 
“worked” 25 years ago, might no longer work in today’s global economy. It therefore seems 
important to extend the analysis here both forward and backward in time. Looking forward, the 
question as to how institutions and governance are important in determining the impact of the 2008-
crisis imposes itself. Looking backward, we might ask whether during times when the world 
economy was less “globalized”, institutions and governance had a different relation to development. 
More data, especially on institutions and governance, will have to be found in order to look at these 
issues. 
The second reason why the current results cannot be viewed as final conclusions is that they do not 
establish any direction of causality. Econometric work is necessary to develop causality. Methods 
for this exist in the literature, and these can be readily applied to the IPD database. Our findings 
here suggest that this work can take the growth rate of an economy as the dependent variable, but in 
this case the institutional and governance indicators need to be sufficiently disaggregated to expect 
significant results. 
Last, but not least, we must point to the need for further theoretical work on the role of institutions 
and governance in explaining economic growth. Our exercise was aimed at finding stylized facts 
that can guide theoretical explorations, and we have uncovered these stylized facts. Thus, we can 
ask to the theoreticians why especially the attitude towards markets and market steering, as well as 
the development level of the financial system, would be correlated to growth, and why other aspects 
of institutions and governance are less directly correlated to the growth rate.  
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Appendices 
I. Loadings obtained in the PCA for IPD sectors 
All loadings in Appendix I have been scaled to make the sum of squared loadings within a principal 
component equal to 1. 
I.A. Sector “Public institutions and civil society” 
IPD 
code IPD description PC1 PC2 PC3 PC4 PC5 PC6 PC7 PC8
a10 Democracy, Legality and Freedom 0.819 -0.452 -0.027 -0.013 -0.030 0.066 -0.026 0.126
a11 Political stability and Legitimacy 0.835 0.044 -0.038 0.163 0.022 0.025 0.017 0.021
a12 Decentralization 0.719 -0.356 0.177 -0.115 -0.195 0.074 0.069 0.062
a20 Domestic public security and Control of violence 0.700 0.326 -0.223 0.057 0.086 -0.083 0.096 0.172
a21 Control of State violence by NGOs 0.685 -0.431 0.081 -0.019 0.051 -0.078 0.138 -0.134
a22 External security 0.379 -0.032 -0.444 0.280 0.087 -0.338 0.136 0.268
a30 Governance of public administration and the justice system 0.954 -0.008 -0.012 0.008 -0.044 -0.022 -0.075 0.051
a31 Autonomy of public policies 0.214 0.292 -0.398 -0.479 0.343 0.027 -0.203 0.189
a32 Donors' influence -0.565 -0.328 0.015 0.128 0.173 -0.083 0.141 0.090
a33 Autonomy in operation and creation of organizations 0.654 -0.639 -0.027 -0.064 0.108 0.087 0.037 0.084
a34 Government capacity to reform 0.795 0.266 -0.110 -0.131 -0.104 -0.028 0.089 0.097
a35 Fiscal exemptions 0.330 -0.357 -0.020 -0.370 -0.090 0.112 0.042 -0.226
a50 Capacity of the State to coordinate stakeholders 0.826 0.159 0.175 -0.145 -0.150 -0.026 -0.085 0.033
a51 Strategic capacities 0.889 0.289 0.109 -0.060 -0.143 0.032 -0.065 -0.044
a52 Government's arbitration capacity 0.556 0.562 -0.034 -0.174 -0.008 -0.054 0.206 -0.038
a53 Institutional capacity 0.824 0.091 0.171 -0.002 -0.111 -0.098 0.005 -0.018
a54 Government political capacity 0.688 0.195 -0.334 0.012 0.078 -0.096 0.037 0.052
a55 Change, Innovation 0.874 -0.053 0.048 0.021 -0.205 0.079 -0.013 0.006
a56 Cooperative behaviour in society 0.614 -0.219 0.294 -0.015 -0.110 0.095 -0.208 -0.001
a57 Outlook of young people 0.530 0.156 0.077 0.065 0.421 -0.035 0.126 -0.404
a60 Security of transactions and contracts 0.934 -0.073 -0.001 -0.001 -0.017 -0.029 -0.070 0.056
a61 Government respect for contracts 0.594 0.079 -0.177 0.267 0.105 0.054 -0.327 -0.014
a62 Frequency of bankruptcy 0.046 -0.127 0.356 -0.014 0.094 -0.497 0.472 0.324
a63 Enforcement of bankruptcy law -0.041 -0.015 0.244 -0.332 0.367 0.411 0.372 0.070
a80 Free movement of people and information 0.357 -0.780 -0.096 0.092 0.045 0.191 0.041 0.017
A8010 Political proximity with the USA 0.358 -0.102 0.082 0.693 0.119 0.130 0.020 0.034
A8011 Political proximity with an European country or the EU 0.423 -0.072 -0.084 0.279 0.591 0.035 -0.153 -0.137
A8012 Political proximity with Japan 0.190 0.244 0.629 0.298 0.009 0.072 -0.029 0.142
A8013 Political proximity with China -0.100 0.280 0.646 -0.133 0.270 0.050 -0.211 0.232
a82 Emulation with neighboring countries 0.364 0.136 0.291 0.201 -0.080 -0.364 -0.042 -0.307
a90 National sense of identity 0.353 0.357 -0.042 0.217 -0.019 0.486 0.267 0.286
a91 National cohesion 0.721 0.268 0.059 0.005 0.068 0.108 -0.122 -0.040
a92 Strenghening of middle classes 0.348 0.259 -0.090 0.095 -0.069 0.147 0.458 -0.450
a93 Social inclusion 0.868 0.140 -0.115 -0.102 -0.091 0.007 0.052 0.046
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IPD 
code IPD description PC1 PC2 PC3 PC4 PC5 PC6 PC7 PC8
a94 Traditional solidarity -0.535 0.089 -0.215 0.333 -0.326 0.250 0.073 0.112
a95f Subsidies on commodities -0.619 0.383 0.022 0.127 -0.062 0.118 -0.017 -0.042
Eigenvalue 13.82 3.22 1.95 1.67 1.26 1.17 1.10 1.03
Fraction of variance 38.38 8.95 5.42 4.65 3.49 3.24 3.04 2.85
Cumulative fraction of variance 38.38 47.33 52.75 57.40 60.89 64.13 67.18 70.03
 
I.B. Sector “Goods and services markets” 
IPD 
code IPD description PC1 PC2 PC3 PC4 PC5 PC6 PC7
b30 Ease of starting a business 0.815 0.032 -0.142 -0.129 0.056 -0.032 0.212
b31 Importance of the Economic zones 0.209 0.510 -0.181 -0.436 0.067 -0.101 -0.322
b32 Consideration of public interest in government-business relations 0.604 0.379 0.204 0.085 0.132 -0.006 -0.246
b33 Governance of natural resources 0.546 -0.097 0.432 -0.004 0.192 -0.105 0.214
b40 Privatizations 0.224 0.161 -0.380 0.480 0.122 -0.196 -0.042
b41 Nationalizations -0.065 0.143 0.542 -0.251 0.033 0.333 0.210
b42 Governance of privatizations 0.549 -0.239 0.295 0.286 0.331 0.053 -0.004
b43 Performance of public organizations 0.585 -0.165 0.083 0.220 -0.193 -0.132 0.325
b44 Freedom of prices 0.645 -0.322 -0.270 -0.157 0.087 -0.004 0.111
b45 Single exchange rate 0.221 0.081 0.268 0.176 0.357 -0.524 0.061
b50 Technological environment 0.849 0.094 0.126 -0.129 -0.053 -0.050 -0.023
b51 Public aid for R&D 0.795 0.259 0.092 -0.196 -0.034 -0.014 -0.090
b52 Density of sub-contracting relations 0.810 0.126 0.001 -0.171 -0.012 -0.061 -0.209
b60 Information on G&S markets 0.925 -0.044 -0.019 -0.048 -0.057 0.047 -0.044
b61 Rural land tenure: traditional property -0.621 -0.105 0.133 -0.181 0.461 0.064 0.068
b62 Rural land tenure: public property -0.265 0.209 -0.117 0.474 0.386 0.190 -0.351
b63 Diversity of land tenure rights systems 0.662 -0.174 -0.137 0.151 -0.413 -0.025 -0.196
b64 Government recognition of diversity of land tenure rights systems 0.649 -0.054 -0.117 0.182 -0.256 0.108 0.089
b65 Land tenure: security of ownership 0.876 -0.086 -0.012 0.082 -0.127 -0.093 0.060
b66 Land tenure: demand for land -0.025 0.442 -0.461 -0.127 0.217 -0.255 0.493
b67 Land tenure and large investors 0.268 0.566 -0.224 -0.029 0.089 0.394 0.319
b70 Competition on G&S markets 0.902 -0.026 0.083 -0.077 0.025 0.061 -0.044
b71 Shareholders: weight of the government -0.281 0.413 0.524 0.139 -0.232 -0.112 0.051
b72 Information on shareholders 0.727 -0.101 0.152 0.072 0.120 0.063 0.020
b73 Land tenure: development policies 0.559 0.493 0.050 0.078 0.136 -0.142 -0.102
b80 Openness to business 0.588 -0.356 -0.166 0.119 0.408 0.257 0.082
b81 Joint Ventures 0.250 0.366 0.025 0.307 -0.102 0.531 0.076
b82 Non-national access to land 0.435 -0.310 -0.097 -0.360 0.269 0.159 -0.226
Eigenvalue 9.89 2.14 1.65 1.39 1.37 1.17 1.08
Fraction of variance 35.31 7.64 5.91 4.97 4.90 4.18 3.85
Cumulative fraction of variance 35.31 42.95 48.86 53.83 58.73 62.91 66.76
 
33 
 
I.C. Sector “Capital markets”  
IPD code IPD description PC1 PC2 PC3
c40 Privatizations in the financial sector -0.006 -0.008 0.736
c41 Nationalizations in the financial sector 0.232 0.427 0.338
c42 Freedom in the allocation of loans 0.719 -0.473 -0.045
c50 Competence of bank executives 0.784 0.134 -0.184
c51 Importance of venture capital 0.687 0.340 0.113
c52 Sovereign wealth fund policy -0.003 0.771 -0.292
c60 Financial information 0.900 -0.064 0.079
c70 Competition within the banking system 0.523 -0.414 0.061
c71 Regulation of competition in banking 0.784 0.114 0.060
c72 Monitoring and auditing in banking 0.843 -0.030 -0.042
c73 Reform of financial regulations 0.243 0.199 0.680
c80 Financial openness 0.714 -0.084 -0.145
c90 Micro lending -0.509 -0.248 0.296
 Eigenvalue 4.89 1.43 1.38
 Fraction of variance 37.65 11.01 10.58
 Cumulative fraction of variance 37.65 48.66 59.24
 
I.D. Sector “Labour markets and labour relations” 
IPD code IPD description PC1 PC2 PC3 PC4
d10 Freedom of association and trade union pluralism 0.582 -0.335 0.474 -0.336
d40 Flexibility in the labour market 0.315 0.208 0.680 -0.123
d41 Retraining and reskilling measures 0.634 -0.155 -0.117 0.210
d50 Adaptive education system 0.861 0.118 -0.150 0.056
d60 Respect for workers' rights 0.848 -0.175 0.026 -0.094
d61 Weak employment contrat rigidity -0.030 0.012 0.321 0.760
d70 Wage bargaining at the individual level -0.377 0.494 0.302 -0.047
d71 Strikes 0.250 0.622 0.062 0.167
d72 Management of labour 0.838 -0.244 0.067 -0.055
d80 Openness to employment of non-nationals 0.414 0.413 -0.074 -0.414
d90 Quality of the supply of public goods 0.796 0.176 -0.263 0.195
d91 Weak segmentation of the labour market 0.613 -0.143 0.408 0.250
d92 Low incidence of child labour 0.783 0.237 -0.242 0.111
d93 Social mobility 0.881 -0.069 0.049 -0.073
d94 Social mobility: young higher education graduates 0.629 0.454 0.000 -0.067
d95 Distribution of income 0.596 -0.207 -0.204 0.042
 Eigenvalue 6.53 1.45 1.27 1.09
 Fraction of variance 40.81 9.04 7.94 6.81
 Cumulative fraction of variance 40.81 49.85 57.79 64.60
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II. Loadings obtained in the PCA for the geography database 
II.1. Disease environment 
code description PC1 PC2 PC3 PC4 PC5 PC6 PC7 PC8
% of country area with malaria, for a given year 
Mal46a 1946 0.690 0.401 -0.091 -0.137 0.051 0.069 0.025 -0.112
Mal66a 1966 0.784 0.167 -0.222 -0.005 -0.001 -0.228 -0.134 -0.200
Mal82a 1982 0.799 0.133 -0.256 0.014 -0.087 -0.318 -0.005 0.005
Mal94a 1994 0.826 0.122 -0.201 0.037 -0.092 -0.258 0.015 0.058
land area with given disease (% country area) 
disa1 yellow fever, 1952 0.813 -0.325 -0.206 -0.132 -0.006 0.132 0.194 -0.077
disa2 plague, 1952 0.041 0.078 -0.093 -0.130 0.065 0.215 -0.420 0.596
disa3 leprosy, 1952 0.649 0.454 0.279 -0.020 -0.032 0.133 -0.033 0.019
disa4 oriental sore leishmaniasis, 1954 0.342 0.049 0.420 -0.279 -0.502 0.239 0.061 0.144
disa5 kala azar leishmaniasis, 1954 -0.002 0.400 0.369 -0.501 0.349 -0.005 0.297 -0.141
disa6 american leishmaniasis, 1954 0.006 0.083 -0.598 -0.112 0.157 0.389 0.152 0.180
disa7 helminthiasis schistosoma haematobium, 1952 0.733 -0.270 0.295 -0.186 -0.177 -0.006 -0.076 0.060
disa8 helminthiasis schistosoma mansoni, 1952 0.701 -0.250 0.077 -0.098 -0.255 0.041 -0.044 -0.008
disa9 helminthiasis filariid mansonella ozzard, 1952 0.031 -0.008 -0.551 -0.110 0.108 0.365 0.225 0.081
disa10 helminthiasis paragoniumus westermani, 1952 0.387 0.517 -0.055 0.483 0.129 0.260 0.029 0.016
disa11 helminthiasis fasciolapsis buski, 1952 0.137 0.632 -0.055 0.278 0.127 -0.401 0.019 0.060
disa12 helminthiasis opisthorchis felineus, 1952 -0.143 -0.103 0.088 0.293 -0.142 -0.004 0.594 0.048
disa13 helminthiasis diphyllobothrium latum, 1952 -0.351 -0.130 0.242 0.413 -0.173 0.096 0.514 0.022
disa14 helminthiasis clonorchis sinensis, 1952 0.013 0.193 0.091 0.378 0.056 0.479 -0.322 -0.589
disa15 helminthiasis hookworm group, 1952 0.597 0.300 0.228 0.152 -0.062 0.296 -0.051 0.209
disa16 helminthiasis filarid loa loa, 1952 0.586 -0.396 0.213 0.239 0.511 0.008 0.015 0.116
disa17 helminthiasis filariid wucheria bancrofti & malayii, 1952 0.780 0.122 0.177 0.187 -0.048 0.188 -0.069 -0.073
disa18 helminthiasis filariid onchocerca volvulus, 1952 0.763 -0.401 0.158 0.095 0.279 0.022 0.034 0.067
disa19 
helminthiasis filariid 
acanthocherlonema 
perstons, 1952 
0.808 -0.359 0.205 0.010 -0.103 0.058 0.025 -0.004
disa20 dengue fever, 1951 0.098 0.754 0.349 0.078 -0.009 -0.035 0.159 0.260
disa21 schistosomiasis, 1987 0.291 -0.285 0.189 0.204 0.613 -0.060 0.030 0.149
disa22 yellow fever, 1996 0.806 -0.313 -0.237 -0.135 -0.005 0.129 0.196 -0.083
disa23 dengue fever, 1975 to 1995 0.535 0.445 -0.480 -0.037 -0.088 -0.021 0.193 -0.005
disa24 lymphatic filiariases, 1984 0.857 -0.055 0.018 0.011 -0.002 -0.235 0.028 -0.078
disa25 visceral leishmaniasis, 1984 -0.054 0.287 0.244 -0.693 0.343 0.090 0.135 -0.172
Eigenvalue 9.26 3.16 2.14 1.83 1.47 1.33 1.26 1.05
Fraction of variance 31.94 10.89 7.38 6.33 5.08 4.58 4.34 3.63
Cum. fraction of variance 31.94 42.84 50.21 56.54 61.62 66.20 70.54 74.17
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II.2. Climate and land quality 
code description PC1 PC2 PC3 PC4 PC5 PC6 PC7
Land in Köppen-Geiger climate zone weighted by cultivated land (revised Matthews classification) 
wcultcaf Af zone  0.537 -0.188 -0.119 -0.452 0.123 0.002 -0.308
wcultcaw Aw zone 0.727 -0.243 -0.028 0.087 -0.100 -0.204 0.152
wcultcam Am zone 0.049 -0.047 -0.232 0.190 -0.122 0.255 0.315
wcultcbs Bs zone -0.226 -0.245 0.682 0.297 0.056 -0.122 0.056
wcultcbw Bw zone -0.281 -0.299 0.268 -0.077 0.201 -0.197 0.543
wcultccf Cf zone -0.218 0.655 -0.363 -0.028 -0.099 0.095 0.206
wcultccs Cs zone -0.351 -0.119 0.177 -0.239 -0.661 0.352 -0.266
wcultccw Cw zone 0.200 -0.085 -0.099 0.650 0.127 0.425 -0.025
wcultcdf Df zone -0.183 0.422 -0.012 0.114 0.089 -0.604 -0.387
wcultcdw Dw zone -0.195 -0.029 -0.084 0.337 0.475 0.221 -0.427
wcultch H zone -0.045 -0.014 0.121 -0.541 0.606 0.342 0.063
Mean irrigation suitability (%) 
irrsuit1 very suitable 0.641 0.381 -0.244 0.013 0.048 -0.061 0.205
irrsuit2 moderately suitable 0.488 0.589 0.508 0.117 -0.003 0.066 -0.022
Mean soil suitability (%) 
soilsui1 very suitable -0.233 0.779 0.343 -0.104 0.036 0.186 0.108
soilsui2 moderately suitable 0.734 -0.027 0.412 -0.043 -0.113 0.149 -0.117
Eigenvalue 2.47 1.98 1.41 1.27 1.16 1.07 1.03
Fraction of variance 16.50 13.17 9.37 8.46 7.75 7.13 6.88
Cumulative fraction of variance 16.50 29.67 39.04 47.50 55.25 62.38 69.26
 
II.3. Physical characteristics 
code description PC1 PC2
elev mean elevation (meters above sea level) -0.397 -0.109
distc mean distance to nearest coastline (km) -0.874 0.368
distr mean distance to nearest inland navigable river (km) -0.143 0.684
lc100km % Land area within 100 km of ice-free coast 0.851 0.381
lcr100km % Land area within 100 km of ice-free coast/navigable river 0.877 0.220
pdenpavg Typical population density experienced by an individual (persons/km2) 0.299 0.265
pop100km Ratio of population within 100 km of ice-free coast to total population 0.842 0.389
pop100cr Ratio of population within 100 km of ice-free coast/navigable river to total population 0.871 0.268
cen_c distance from centroid of country to nearest coast (km) -0.829 0.491
cen_cr distance from centroid of country to nearest coast or sea-navigable river (km) -0.827 0.452
Eigenvalue 5.36 1.55
Fraction of variance 53.62 15.48
Cumulative fraction of variance 53.62 69.10
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III. Loadings obtained in the canonical correlation analysis between single economic 
development indicators and all IPD variables 
IPD 
variable 
LY00 
(R=0.91) 
GR 
(R=0.64) 
C 
(R=0.57) 
I 
(R=0.55)
G 
(R=0.57)
OPEN 
(R=0.59)
GRVAR 
(R=0.57) 
AF1  0.34  ‐0.20  0.34  0.21 0.20 ‐0.02 ‐0.73 
AF2  ‐0.01  0.21  0.15  0.25 0.04 ‐0.18 0.05 
AF3  ‐0.06  ‐0.01  ‐0.04  ‐0.08 ‐0.04 0.52 0.08 
AF4  0.04  0.27  0.18  ‐0.06 0.17 ‐0.22 0.02 
AF5  0.02  0.04  0.03  0.07 ‐0.08 ‐0.18 0.05 
AF6  0.03  0.27  0.09  0.01 ‐0.34 0.28 0.06 
AF7  ‐0.06  0.13  ‐0.26  ‐0.06 ‐0.19 0.11 0.02 
AF8  0.00  ‐0.21  0.05  ‐0.17 0.15 0.04 ‐0.02 
BF1  0.28  0.49  0.33  ‐0.22 0.36 ‐0.19 0.28 
BF2  0.18  ‐0.04  0.17  ‐0.35 0.30 0.32 0.07 
BF3  0.14  ‐0.02  ‐0.14  ‐0.15 ‐0.33 0.02 0.11 
BF4  0.03  0.09  ‐0.03  ‐0.06 0.36 ‐0.08 0.12 
BF5  ‐0.27  ‐0.13  ‐0.03  0.15 0.06 ‐0.16 ‐0.03 
BF6  0.00  0.04  0.04  0.16 0.03 ‐0.29 0.03 
BF7  0.05  0.09  0.01  ‐0.11 0.14 ‐0.12 ‐0.05 
CF1  0.67  ‐0.54  0.20  ‐0.60 ‐0.24 0.23 ‐0.37 
CF2  0.10  0.03  ‐0.07  0.12 0.09 0.24 ‐0.01 
CF3  ‐0.21  0.04  ‐0.07  0.18 ‐0.35 0.24 ‐0.13 
DF1  0.07  0.23  ‐0.69  0.40 0.10 ‐0.14 0.36 
DF2  0.17  ‐0.05  0.11  0.06 0.18 ‐0.10 ‐0.06 
DF3  ‐0.34  0.25  ‐0.05  ‐0.08 0.19 0.24 0.22 
DF4  0.12  ‐0.08  0.24  ‐0.12 0.03 ‐0.01 ‐0.07 
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IV. Loadings obtained in the canonical correlation analysis between all economic development 
indicators and all IPD variables 
IV.1. IPD side 
  F1  F2  F3  F4  F5 F6 F7 
AF1  0.46  ‐0.13  ‐0.27  0.25  0.02 ‐0.65 0.60 
AF2  0.05  0.24  ‐0.24  0.01  0.16 ‐0.10 ‐0.12 
AF3  ‐0.02  0.00  0.34  ‐0.08  0.12 ‐0.01 0.02 
AF4  0.13  0.28  ‐0.10  0.17  ‐0.17 0.10 ‐0.03 
AF5  ‐0.01  0.03  ‐0.13  ‐0.03  ‐0.01 0.00 ‐0.16 
AF6  0.09  0.30  0.07  ‐0.19  ‐0.16 ‐0.06 ‐0.24 
AF7  ‐0.05  0.11  0.00  ‐0.25  ‐0.20 0.13 0.15 
AF8  ‐0.04  ‐0.21  0.19  0.19  0.00 0.04 0.01 
BF1  0.40  0.47  0.11  0.21  ‐0.14 0.36 ‐0.39 
BF2  0.23  ‐0.06  0.48  0.22  ‐0.01 0.17 ‐0.09 
BF3  0.04  ‐0.06  0.08  ‐0.24  ‐0.23 0.16 ‐0.32 
BF4  0.07  0.06  0.07  0.10  0.13 0.22 0.10 
BF5  ‐0.31  ‐0.11  ‐0.15  0.12  0.13 ‐0.10 0.14 
BF6  ‐0.02  0.04  ‐0.23  0.02  0.10 ‐0.03 ‐0.09 
BF7  0.09  0.08  ‐0.02  0.09  ‐0.16 0.11 0.12 
CF1  0.52  ‐0.59  0.45  0.11  ‐0.56 ‐0.09 ‐0.27 
CF2  0.16  0.03  0.06  ‐0.14  0.26 ‐0.06 0.15 
CF3  ‐0.18  0.09  ‐0.09  ‐0.18  ‐0.04 ‐0.26 0.16 
DF1  0.04  0.13  ‐0.29  ‐0.68  0.56 0.38 0.21 
DF2  0.18  ‐0.06  ‐0.05  0.09  0.14 ‐0.07 0.00 
DF3  ‐0.24  0.27  0.21  0.08  0.05 0.21 0.14 
DF4  0.11  ‐0.07  0.10  0.20  ‐0.10 ‐0.08 ‐0.17 
 
IV.2. Economic development side 
  F1  F2  F3  F4  F5 F6 F7 
LY00  0.95  ‐0.16  0.04  ‐0.51  0.17 0.13 ‐0.31 
GR  0.17  0.97  ‐0.18  ‐0.13  ‐0.27 0.19 0.14 
C  0.03  0.15  0.13  0.61  0.02 ‐0.54 ‐0.47 
I  0.02  0.06  ‐0.41  ‐0.24  0.58 ‐0.49 0.02 
G  0.16  ‐0.03  0.21  0.48  0.52 0.30 0.51 
OPEN  0.14  0.08  0.80  ‐0.22  0.37 ‐0.31 0.16 
GRVAR  ‐0.13  ‐0.09  0.32  ‐0.12  0.39 0.48 ‐0.61 
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V. Loadings obtained in the canonical correlation analysis between single IPD dimensions and 
all geographical variables 
  F1  F2  F3 
DIS1  ‐0.57  0.44  0.34 
DIS2  ‐0.16  0.29  0.40 
DIS3  ‐0.11  ‐0.16  0.09 
DIS4  ‐0.03  0.04  ‐0.07 
DIS5  ‐0.02  0.10  ‐0.02 
DIS6  0.09  ‐0.09  0.21 
DIS7  ‐0.05  0.19  0.09 
DIS8  ‐0.12  0.14  ‐0.10 
CLI1  ‐0.25  ‐0.64  ‐0.26 
CLI2  0.28  0.16  0.15 
CLI3  ‐0.44  0.23  ‐0.02 
CLI4  ‐0.23  0.22  0.01 
CLI5  ‐0.12  0.21  0.23 
CLI6  ‐0.18  ‐0.11  0.61 
CLI7  ‐0.14  ‐0.13  0.04 
PHYS1  0.28  0.07  ‐0.26 
PHYS2  0.27  0.01  0.27 
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